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1. Introduction 
 
The theoretical literature on fiscal interaction among local governments is fairly well 
developed and has identified several potential sources for interdependence in taxation and 
spending decisions. The implications of fiscal interaction for the efficiency of public service 
provision and the allocation of resources across jurisdictions have been studied in various 
settings (see Wilson, 1999, and Wilson and Wildasin, 2004, for reviews). By contrast, 
empirical research on fiscal interaction among jurisdictions is still relatively scarce and the 
identification strategies used do not generally meet the standard required for the results to 
have a causal interpretation.  
The estimation of the responses of jurisdictions to taxes and spending in other jurisdictions is 
fraught with endogeneity issues. Firstly, the interdependence of taxation and spending 
decisions among neighbouring jurisdictions leads to two-way causality, which renders 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the reaction functions inconsistent. Secondly, tax 
rates in neighbouring municipalities may be driven by spatially correlated unobserved factors 
that lead to spurious correlation in tax rates. This paper studies municipal property taxes in 
Finland and utilizes a Finnish policy change as a source of exogenous variation in tax rates to 
overcome these identification problems. The purpose of the paper is to estimate the responses 
of Finnish municipalities to property tax rates in neighbouring municipalities. In addition, the 
causal estimates based on the policy change are compared with standard spatial econometrics 
methods that have been commonly used in the literature. 
In Finland, municipalities choose property tax rates within limits set by the central 
government. In the year 2000, the lower limits to the general property tax rate and the 
residential building tax rate were raised. The reform caused imposed increases in tax rates 
that can be used to estimate the effect of tax rates in nearby municipalities on the tax rate 
choices of municipalities. Changes in property tax rates are regressed on changes in the 
average property tax rate of neighbouring municipalities by Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
regression. Imposed increases in neighbours’ tax rates are used as an instrument for the actual 
change in neighbours’ tax rates.  
Earlier empirical studies fall into two main categories based on how they have tried to 
address the issue of simultaneous determination of policy choices (see Brueckner, 2003, for a 
review). The first group uses the so called Spatial Lag (SL) models that estimate reaction 
functions using non-linear regression and maximum likelihood methods.1 The estimation of 
neighbourhood effects by SL models hinges on the assumption that the determinants of tax 
rates, apart from neighbours’ tax rates, are exogenous. Moreover, the SL method imposes 
restrictive distributional and functional form assumptions. The second group, termed Spatial 
                                                     
1 For example Allers and Elhorst (2005), Bordignon et al. (2003), Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) and Revelli 
(2001) estimate tax rate reaction functions with the SL model. 
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Instrumental Variables (SIV) models in this paper, estimates the reaction functions by 
Instrumental Variables regression using neighbours’ attributes, such as age structure and 
income, as instruments for their tax rates.2 Like the SL method, the SIV method also assumes 
that the jurisdiction attributes used as the determinants of tax rates are exogenous. For 
example endogenous sorting of individuals to communities with different combinations of 
taxes and services will bias the standard SIV estimates as well as the SL estimates 
(Brueckner, 2003).  
Gibbons and Overman (2010) analyse identification issues in spatial econometrics models 
and argue that reliable estimation of causal spatial interaction parameters requires quasi-
experimental settings that provide exogenous variation in the variable of interest. This paper 
is, along with Eugster and Parchet (2011)3, the first study using a quasi-experimental design 
to estimate tax competition reaction functions.4  
The empirical results of this study suggest that there is no significant interaction in property 
tax rate choices among Finnish municipalities. While this finding is consistent with the 
theoretical literature discussed in Section 2, it is in contrast with the previous empirical 
literature that has mainly found the dependence of tax rates in neighbouring jurisdictions to 
be positive. Allers and Elhorst (2005) provide a table of nearly twenty empirical studies on 
local tax competition including studies using the SL and SIV methods. In their list, the 
median estimate for the response to a percentage point increase in tax rates in neighbouring 
jurisdictions is 0.4 percentage points and most estimates fall between 0.2 and 0.6. I compare 
the estimates based on the policy change to SL and SIV estimates with Finnish data. The 
comparisons suggest that the SL and SIV models may have a tendency to give upward biased 
estimates of the degree of fiscal interaction.  
Section 2 of this paper summarizes theoretical literature on the sources of tax competition and 
discusses the relevance of different theories for the Finnish setting. Section 3 provides a 
description of the Finnish property tax system and discusses the reform of 2000 which will be 
utilized in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 reports 
the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Theoretical background 
 
2.1. Sources of tax competition 
                                                     
2 Papers estimating tax-reaction functions with the Spatial IV model include Besley and Case (1995), Buettner 
(2001), Revelli (2002) and Edmark and Ågren (2008).  
3 Eugster and Parchet (2011) use a regression discontinuity approach to study tax competition in Swiss 
municipalities around the French/German language border. 
4 Dahlberg and Edmark (2008) use a Swedish policy intervention as a source of exogenous variation in welfare 
benefit levels to study “race-to-the-bottom” in welfare benefits. 
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Wilson (1999) surveys theoretical literature on tax competition and divides tax competition 
models into two main categories. As a benchmark category he uses Tiebout (1956) type 
models of public service provision that assume that there are many small jurisdictions 
providing public services funded by non-distorting taxes so as to maximize land value in the 
jurisdiction. Households are mobile and choose jurisdictions that provide their preferred 
bundle of taxes and services. Intergovernmental competition benefits consumers by creating a 
variety of tax-service bundles for consumers to choose. The sorting of different households 
into different communities leads to an efficient level of public services and improves 
efficiency compared with the situation where taxation and service provision are centralized. 
Accordingly, these models are often referred to as models of efficient tax competition. 
Subsequent work has generalized these models to apply to firms (see Richter and Wellisch, 
1996). In the efficient tax competition models there is no strategic interaction at a localized 
level since each jurisdiction is small relative to the economy. Households or firms are fully 
mobile and there are no externalities or distortions related to local taxation and the provision 
of local public goods. The second category of tax competition models includes models that 
depart from the idealized setting of the Tiebout type models in one way or another that may 
lead to strategic interaction among jurisdictions. Three main sources of strategic fiscal 
interaction identified in the literature are 1) benefit spillovers 2) distorting taxes on mobile 
tax base 3) political economy considerations and information asymmetries.  
Benefit spillovers arise if residents of a jurisdiction can benefit from services provided by 
other jurisdictions. Benefit spillovers will lead to negative dependence in tax rates since 
higher spending in a jurisdiction reduces the need to spend in other jurisdictions (see Case et 
al., 1993). The level of services will be inefficiently low since municipalities do not take into 
account the positive fiscal externality for others. Benefit spillovers can arise if for instance 
access to parks and other amenities cannot be restricted to the residents of the jurisdiction 
providing the amenity. Negative spending spillovers are naturally possible and will lead to 
positive tax rate interaction. For example, higher police spending in one jurisdiction may give 
rise to a negative externality if criminals respond by moving their activity to other 
jurisdictions where committing crimes is less risky. 
The second class of tax competition models departs from the efficient tax competition setting 
by assuming that lump sum taxes are not available and services are funded by distorting 
taxes. Typically, these models study capital taxes or property taxes that fall at least partly on 
capital which is mobile across jurisdictions. Mobility of capital leads to downward pressure 
on tax rates since a lower tax rate in one jurisdiction attracts tax base from other jurisdictions 
and forces them to lower their tax rate. Competition for mobile tax base leads to an 
inefficiently low level of public services since jurisdictions have to take into account the 
negative effect of higher taxes on their tax base. In other words, higher taxes in one 
jurisdiction cause a positive fiscal externality for others. In the competitive versions of tax 
competition models there are many relatively small jurisdictions that take the net return of 
capital as given, and hence, strategic behaviour is absent (e.g. Zodorow and Mieszkowski, 
1986). If jurisdictions are sufficiently large to affect the net rate of return, tax rates are set 
strategically taking into account tax rates in other jurisdictions (e.g. Wildasin 1988).  
4
  
For the purposes of empirical work on local taxes it is important to note that strategic tax 
competition among jurisdictions in the same region requires that capital is not fully mobile 
but to some extent fixed to the region (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001).5 Another issue with 
important implications for empirical work concerns the heterogeneity of preferences for local 
public services. With identical households, a tax cut in one jurisdiction causes other 
jurisdictions to bid down their tax rates as they compete for the tax base. However, 
heterogeneous preferences and the sorting of high and low demand residents into different 
municipalities may give rise to negative interdependence in tax rates. A tax decrease in a low 
demand jurisdiction may induce high demand jurisdictions to increase their tax rates even 
further in an attempt to retain high service levels. Drawing on Brueckner (2000), Brueckner 
and Saavedra (2001) combine heterogeneous preferences and locally fixed tax base and show 
that in a model with two jurisdictions competing for a fixed amount of capital, the 
relationship between capital tax rates in the jurisdictions may be positive or negative (or flat).  
The third type of tax competition takes place if voters use tax rates in their jurisdiction 
relative to other jurisdictions as a yard-stick to evaluate how well their government is 
performing. The underlying assumption is that politicians and civil servants are at least partly 
motivated by self-interest and may use public funds for their own benefit. So called yard-
stick competition or tax mimicking arises if the true costs of providing public services are 
known only by the local government and not observed by voters but tax rates are common 
knowledge (Besley and Case, 1995). In this setting, voters may utilize the fact that the costs 
of providing services in their jurisdiction are likely to be correlated with other jurisdictions in 
the area to assess the performance of their government. Relatively high taxes may indicate 
that the government is inefficient or rent seeking and should be voted out of office. As a 
result, governments are forced to imitate their neighbours in order to stay in office. 
2.2. Discussion on the relevance for the Finnish setting 
Arguably, benefit spillovers are unlikely to be an important source of fiscal interaction in the 
Finnish setting since the bulk of services provided by the municipalities are publicly provided 
private goods, such as schools, health care, nurseries and elderly care. Residents of other 
municipalities can be easily excluded from these services. Some local amenities, such as 
parks, may generate benefit spillovers but the budget share of non-excludable amenities is 
very small compared to excludable services. Competition for tax base and politically 
motivated yardstick competition are more potential sources of spatial interdependence in tax 
rates in Finland.  
The next section discusses the Finnish property tax system and argues that the property taxes 
studied here fall partly on business and housing capital. A higher property tax rate lowers the 
profitability of investment in the municipality and may cause capital to locate in other 
municipalities, which makes competition with tax rates in an attempt to attract capital 
                                                     
5 Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) argue that some industries are likely tied to specific regions, and that part of a 
region’s capital stock is oriented towards serving the local population (e.g. retail establishments). 
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possible. As shown by Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), the sign of tax rate interaction due to 
the tax base competition mechanism is ambiguous a priori. 
Yardstick competition may be relevant to the Finnish case since Finnish municipalities are 
governed by elected councils. Information on tax rates is easily available, but comparing the 
efficiency of service provision across municipalities is difficult. Municipalities provide a 
wide range of services and there are no commonly used performance rating systems. Hence, 
voters may use tax rates as a benchmark when evaluating the performance of their council 
relative to other councils in the area. 
As the observed patterns of tax rate interaction with Finnish data are likely to be a 
combination of tax base competition (sign ambiguous), yardstick competition (positive) and 
possibly benefit spillovers (positive), the expected relationship between tax rates in nearby 
municipalities is ambiguous. 
3. Institutional setting and the policy intervention  
 
3.1. The Finnish property tax system  
Property taxation was introduced in Finland in 1993 to replace a disintegrated system of fees 
and charges on real property. Property taxes are collected by local municipalities which are 
responsible for the provision of the bulk of public services, such as elementary schools, basic 
health care, day care for children and elderly care.6 Municipal expenditure is roughly 20 % of  
GDP and municipalities employ almost 20% of the labour force.  
The two main components of the Finnish property tax system are the general property tax 
and the residential building tax.7 The general property tax is applied to both residential and 
commercial land and commercial buildings. The taxable value of land is based on the 
estimated market value of a similar undeveloped site, regardless of whether the site is 
actually developed. Hence, the taxable value of land is independent of the development 
decisions of the land owner and the general property tax is a neutral land tax, to the extent 
that it is applied to land (Lyytikäinen, 2009). However, the general property tax is also levied 
on commercial buildings, valued at the estimated construction cost less depreciation. The part 
of the general property tax that falls on buildings makes investment less profitable and may 
cause capital to relocate implying a lower tax base in the long run. Hence, municipalities may 
use the general property tax as a means to attract business capital. 
                                                     
6 See Moisio, Loikkanen and Oulasvirta (2010) for a more detailed description of the Finnish local public 
finance and service provision system.  
7 In addition, municipalities can apply differential tax rates to un-developed residential lots, non-permanent 
dwellings (essentially vacation homes) and power stations. Non-profit organisations may be exempt from 
property taxes. 
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Residential buildings are taxed at a separate tax rate, which is lower than the general rate. The 
assessed value of residential buildings is based on estimated construction costs less 
depreciation, similar to commercial buildings. A higher residential building tax rate, other 
things constant, makes housing investment in the municipality less profitable and may lead to 
a lower tax base over time. Therefore, the residential property tax could be used as an 
instrument in the competition for housing capital. 
The local flat rate income tax and grants from central government are the most important 
sources of income for municipalities. Property taxes are relatively unimportant in terms of 
revenue accounting for less than 5 % of local revenues, but the fact that property taxes fall 
partly on capital makes property taxation important for competition for capital. Attracting 
investment to the municipality not only increases the property tax base but also affects 
municipal revenues indirectly through the national corporate tax, part of which is 
redistributed to municipalities where the firms are located. In addition, higher business capital 
may benefit the residents of the municipality by improving employment possibilities, which 
in turn boosts municipal income tax revenues. 
The Finnish grant system includes an equalization component which dampens the incentives 
to compete for tax base. The system is based on imputed revenues that are calculated 
applying the average municipal income tax rates and property tax rates to the tax base of each 
municipality. The system then allocates revenues from rich municipalities with imputed 
revenue above an equalization limit (roughly 90% of average imputed per capita revenue) to 
poorer municipalities below the equalization limit. Municipalities above the equalization 
limit give up about 60% of their imputed revenue exceeding the limit and this revenue is used 
to raise the imputed revenues of poorer municipalities to the limit. The system weakens 
incentives to attract tax base, but municipalities above the limit still benefit from a higher tax 
base as they can keep 40% of the increase in imputed revenues. For a municipality below the 
limit an increase in the tax base may have little direct effect on revenues8, but it may benefit 
from higher business capital indirectly through, for example, better employment 
opportunities.  
3.2. Property tax limits and the reform of 2000 
Municipalities choose property tax rates within limits which are set by central government. 
The initial allowed range in 1993 for the general property tax rate was 0.2 – 0.8% and 0.1 – 
0.4% for the residential building tax. In 1999, the upper limit for the general property tax rate 
was raised from 0.8% to 1% and the upper limit for the residential building tax rate was 
raised from 0.4% to 0.5%. This reform was relatively unimportant as the upper limit to the 
general property tax was binding for only a handful of municipalities and the upper limit to 
the residential building tax was binding for none of the municipalities.  
                                                     
8 If the tax rate of the municipality below the equalization limit is above the average tax rate used to calculate 
the imputed revenue, higher tax base increases revenues by the amount exceeding the increase in imputed 
revenue of the municipality. 
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In 1999 the government decided to raise the lower limits for the year 2000. The lower limit to   
the general property tax rate rose from 0.2% to 0.5% and the lower limit to the residential 
building tax rose from 0.1% to 0.22%. Graph 1 shows the distribution of tax rates in the year 
1999 before the reform. The residential building tax is on the horizontal axis and the general 
property tax is on the vertical axis. The size of the circle is proportionate to the number of 
municipalities in the cell. The lower limits for both tax rates in the years 1999 and 2000 are 
indicated with lines. The new limit to the general property tax was binding for approximately 
40% of the municipalities and the new lower limit to the residential building tax was binding 
for roughly 30% of the municipalities. Before the reform, less than 5% of the municipalities 
applied tax rates corresponding to the lower limits. The graph shows that the reform implied 
large forced increases in tax rates for many municipalities. Section 4 describes how these 
imposed tax increases triggered by the reform are utilized to construct an instrumental 
variable for changes in neighbours’ tax rates.  
[Graph 1 here] 
4. Empirical strategy 
 
4.1. Empirical model 
Empirical studies on fiscal interaction are concerned with estimating reaction functions that 
give the value of the decision variable of a jurisdiction as a function of spatially weighted 
decisions of other jurisdictions (see Brueckner, 2003, for a review). The empirical model 
estimated in this study is written as 
(1)   ∑
≠
++++=
ij
itititjtijit emkXTwT γβ . 
The dependent variable Tit is the property tax rate in municipality i in year t. The explanatory 
variable of interest is the weighted average tax rate of other municipalities j weighted by 
spatial weights wij. An often used weighting scheme gives neighbours positive weights and 
zero weights to other municipalities. I use the nearest neighbour weight matrix as the base 
specification but test the robustness of the findings to alternative weight matrices discussed in 
Section 4.6. The vector Xit includes time-varying municipality attributes affecting tax rate 
choices, such as age structure and income. The model includes year fixed effects kt which 
capture time variant unobserved factors that are common to all municipalities. Municipality 
fixed effects mi include municipality specific time invariant factors.  
OLS estimates of the slope of the reaction function (parameter β) will be biased because, with 
non-zero β, the simultaneous determination of tax rates makes neighbours’ tax rates 
endogenous. I address this endogeneity issue by using the policy intervention described in 
Section 3 as a source of exogenous variation in neighbours’ tax rates. A further challenge is 
spatially correlated omitted variables giving rise to spurious spatial correlation in tax rates. I 
address this issue by differencing the data over time to control for time invariant unobserved 
8
  
heterogeneity. Before describing the empirical strategy in detail, I briefly discuss the standard 
spatial econometrics methods used in much of the previous literature. In Section 5, I compare 
the policy change based estimates with the standard spatial econometrics estimates. 
4.2. Standard spatial econometrics methods 
In previous studies the simultaneity of tax rates has been addressed by estimating the so 
called Spatial Lag (SL) models and Spatial Instrumental Variables (SIV) models discussed 
for example in Anselin (2001).  
The SL model is derived by first writing (1) in matrix form. Assuming that the error term is 
i.i.d. normally distributed with constant variance makes it possible to solve the reduced form 
equation for the vector of tax rates and write the likelihood function. The spatial lag 
parameter β is then estimated by maximum likelihood. The SL models rely on highly 
restrictive assumptions regarding the error distribution and the functional form of the reaction 
function. Crucially, consistent estimation of β requires that the socio-economic attributes 
used as tax rate determinants are exogenous to tax rates (Brueckner, 2003). This assumption 
is unlikely to hold because of omitted variables and because the attributes used typically 
include characteristics like income and age structure that are endogenously determined in 
Tiebout (1956) type models of sorting. Moreover, even if the X’s are exogenous, spatially 
correlated error terms or direct effects of neighbours’ X’s on T make the standard SL 
inconsistent. The latter two issues have been addressed by testing alternative specifications or 
specifying more complicated models incorporating the direct effects of neighbours’ 
exogenous attributes and/or spatially correlated errors.9 Identification of β in an expanded 
model containing spatially correlated errors and direct effects of neighbours X’s is in 
principle possible assuming that the specified model corresponds to the true data generating 
process, but it is based on a combination of cross-coefficient restrictions and the structure 
given to the spatial weight matrix (Gibbons and Overman, 2010).10 
The main alternative to the SL model is the SIV model which uses the spatial lags of socio-
economic determinants of tax rates (the X variables in equation (1)) as instruments for the 
spatial lags of tax rates.11 The model can be estimated by standard 2SLS. The identifying 
assumption behind the SIV model is that neighbours’ X variables are uncorrelated with the 
error term. This assumption is violated if own X’s are correlated with own error term and the 
                                                     
9 Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), among others, provide a robust test for spatial autocorrelation in the error 
term. Case et al. (1993) specify a model that incorporates spatial autocorrelation in the error term.   
10 In the peer effects literature it has long been recognized that the correlation of errors within peer groups or a 
direct effect of group’s X’s on individual outcomes makes it impossible to identify the effect of the groups’ 
outcomes on individual outcomes (Manski, 1993). In spatial econometrics models identification is in principle 
possible because typical spatial weight matrices are such that two neighbours do not have identical ‘peer groups’ 
(they weight each other differently). In technical terms, identification is possible because spatial weight matrices 
are typically not idempotent (Gibbons and Overman, 2010).  
11 Higher order spatial lags are sometimes used in addition to the first order lags (e.g. Buettner, 2001). 
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error terms are spatially correlated (Gibbons and Overman, 2010). Thus any spatially 
correlated omitted factors that are correlated with the X’s would render the SIV estimates 
inconsistent. It is easy to come up with economic mechanisms giving rise to bias in the SIV 
estimates. In tax competition applications, the instruments typically include characteristics 
like income and age structure that are endogenously determined in Tiebout (1956) type 
models of sorting, and hence, the X’s are likely correlated with the error term (Brueckner, 
2003). Spatial autocorrelation in the error term arises, for example, through sorting on 
unobservables (e.g. unobserved taste for public services) or causal linkages between between 
unobservables (e.g. through mobility between neighbours).  
A further problem of the SIV approach is that the predictive power of the instrumental 
variables is often low leading to a weak instrument problem, especially in a panel data fixed 
effects setting, which means that even weak correlation between the instruments and the error 
term may lead to a large bias. Accordingly, studies using SIV with panel data and controlling 
for fixed effects are rare.12 
Gibbons and Overman (2010) provide a more formal and extensive analysis of the 
identification issues related to spatial econometrics models including the SIV and SL models. 
They argue that more convincing identification strategies are needed to obtain plausible 
estimates for spatial interaction. In other areas of applied empirical economics it has become 
standard to utilize policy interventions, discontinuities in policy rules and other quasi-
experimental settings that provide a source of exogenous variation in the explanatory variable 
of interest to identify its effect on the outcome variable. This paper is, along with Eugster and 
Parchet (2011), the first to use quasi-experimental data to estimate tax competition reaction 
functions. In order to assess the performance of the standard spatial econometrics methods, I 
will compare the SL and SIV estimates with the quasi-experimental estimates. I will use both 
cross-sectional and fixed effects variants of the SL and SIV methods. 
4.3. Policy change based IV strategy 
The Finnish property tax reform of 2000 described in Section 3.2 provides an opportunity to 
study the causal relationship between tax rates in Finnish municipalities. My empirical 
strategy is similar to the SIV approach discussed in the previous subsection. The crucial 
difference is that I utilize the policy intervention to replace the municipality attributes X, 
which are unlikely to be valid instruments, with an arguably exogenously determined variable 
affecting changes in tax rates.   
I use the panel property of the data and difference the equation (1) to get the following 
estimating equation  
(2)   ∑
≠
−−− ++−+−=−
ij
ittititjtjtijitit ulXXTTwTT )()( 111 γβ . 
                                                     
12 Besley and Case (1995) and Revelli (2001) use differenced data to control for jurisdiction fixed effects. 
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Municipality fixed effects cancel out in the differencing. Hence, I control for time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity, which can be arbitrarily correlated with neighbours’ tax rates.   
The model (2) is written in a general form, but the empirical analysis exploits tax rate 
changes from 1999 to 2000 generated by the policy change. As described in Section 3.2 the 
reform created imposed increases in the tax rates of many municipalities in the year 2000. 
Actual imposed increases are not observable because we do not know which tax rates 
municipalities would have chosen had there not been increases in the lower bounds for the 
tax rates. I construct a measure of predicted imposed increase in the tax rate and, similarly as 
in the SIV approach, I use the spatially lagged predicted imposed increase as an instrument 
for the spatially lagged tax rate change in equation (2). I define the predicted imposed tax rate 
increase in municipality i in year 2000 as 
(3)  ))(( 19982000199820002000 iii TTTTDZ −>= . 
In equation (3), T denotes the lower limit to the property tax rate and )( 19982000 iTTD >  is a 
dummy variable that gets the value one if the municipality had a tax rate below the lower 
limit of the year 2000 in the year 1998. Thus, predicted imposed increase is zero if the tax 
rate in 1998 is above the lower limit of year 2000 and positive if Ti1998 < T2000. I use the year 
1998 as the base year for defining the predicted imposed increase, because it is close enough 
to the year of policy reform to provide a strong prediction but not causally linked with the 
error term of equation (2). Year 1999 cannot be used as the base year since both the error 
term of equation (2) and the predicted imposed increase would then depend on the error term 
of the level equation (1), which would mean that the instrument is not valid. Moreover, I 
include the own imposed tax rate increase in municipality i in the model to control for the 
direct effect of the policy change on the municipality. Controlling for own imposed increases 
is important because, due to spatial correlation in tax rate levels, municipalities with large 
imposed increases in their neighbourhood are likely to experience an imposed increase too. 
Not controlling for own imposed increase would imply that the instrument is correlated with 
the error term of (2) and bias estimation.  
I use spatially lagged predicted imposed increases as an instrument for neighbours’ actual tax 
rate changes in 2000 and is written as 
(4)  ∑∑
≠≠
−>=
ij
jjij
ij
jij TTTTDwZw ))(( 199820001998200002000 . 
Variation in the instrument is driven by predetermined tax rates of neighbours Tj1998 and the  
new lower bound T2000 set by the central government. For example, consider municipality A 
which has two neighbours B and C with general property tax rates TB1998 = 0.4% and TC1998 = 
0.6%. In the year 2000, the lower limit to the general property tax rate rises from 0.2% to 
T2000 = 0.5%. Thus, the predicted imposed increase for municipality B is ZB1998 = 0.1% and 
ZC1998 = 0%. The value of the instrument for municipality A is the weighted average of these 
imposed increases (0.05%). The instrument is not a perfect predictor, albeit a very strong one, 
of actual tax rate changes in the neighbourhood because municipalities adjust their tax rates 
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for other reasons too – and because tax rates in 1998 are used as the base year to rule out 
endogeneity.     
A good instrument has to be both relevant (a strong predictor of tax rate changes) and valid 
(orthogonal to the error term). The empirical analysis confirms the relevance of the 
instrument. I argue that the validity condition is very likely to hold as well because the 
instrument is based on a policy change which can be considered exogenous to individual 
municipalities. The identifying assumption is that the instrument is uncorrelated with the 
error term of equation (2). Correlation of the instrument with trends or shocks in unobserved 
factors could violate this assumption. In Section 5.3 I evaluate the likely validity of the 
instrument through a placebo treatment type methodology by using tax rate changes in pre-
policy change years as the dependent variable. The placebo tests suggest that the instrument 
is valid.  
A potential weakness of the first differenced model is that it presumes a contemporaneous 
reaction to neighbours’ tax rate changes. In order to allow for more sluggish responses, I 
estimate models with 2-5 year differences for the dependent variable, in addition to model 
(2).  
4.4. Corner solutions 
The fact that many municipalities are likely to be constrained by the new lower limit in 2000 
complicates the analysis. The reaction functions of municipalities that end up in a corner 
solution are latent. This may bias the estimation because municipalities for which the new 
lower bound is a binding constraint appear not to respond to tax rate changes in other 
municipalities even if in an unconstrained situation they would respond. Figure 1 illustrates 
this issue and depicts the reaction functions of two municipalities A (horizontal axis) and B 
(vertical axes). The dashed lines represent the lower limits to their tax rates in 1999 and 2000. 
Before the reform in 1999 the equilibrium tax rates are given by the point where the straight 
reaction lines TA(TB) and TB(TA) cross. The reform forces municipality A to raise its tax rate 
to T2000 and municipality B responds by raising its tax rate to the value where the vertical line 
at T2000 crosses its reaction function. Municipality A is forced off its reaction function which 
becomes vertical up to the point where TA(TB) > T2000. Hence, the responses of municipality A 
may not be informative of the slope of the unconstrained reaction function.  
[Figure 1 here] 
In order to eliminate the possible bias due to corner solutions I omit municipalities that, in 
1999, had a tax rate below the new lower limit of the year 2000. The remaining sub-sample 
contains municipalities for which the new lower bound in the year 2000 was not likely to be a 
binding constraint. The presence of the lower bound may still work against finding a negative 
response to neighbours’ tax rates but positive responses will be detected. Neighbours’ tax 
rates are still calculated using the whole sample. 
4.5. Heterogeneous effects 
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In Figure 1 the slopes of the reaction functions of the two municipalities are linear and more 
or less the same. If reaction functions differ significantly across municipalities or the slope 
varies over the range of neighbours’ tax rates, the policy change IV estimates may not be 
generalised to apply to the whole population of municipalities. The policy change based IV 
strategy estimates a variable treatment intensity version of the Local Average Treatment 
Effect (LATE) termed the Average Causal Response (ACR) in Angrist and Imbens (1995).  
ACR is the weighted average of responses of municipalities to a unit change in neighbours’ 
tax rates, for municipalities whose neighbours’ tax rates were affected by the policy change. 
Municipalities whose neighbours were greatly affected by the policy change get larger 
weights. As discussed in Section 4.4., the basic experimental design is such that the reactions 
by low-tax jurisdictions are not observed because they are equally subject to the country-wide 
policy change. If low tax municipalities are more responsive to neighbours’ tax rates, this 
implies that the policy change based ACR estimate will be a downward biased estimate of the 
average causal response in the whole population. In other words, the omission of 
municipalities likely to end up in a corner solution means that municipalities with very low 
tax rates get zero weights. An additional potential issue is that the identifying variation in 
neighbours’ average tax rates comes from low tax municipalities being forced to raise their 
tax rates. This may bias estimates if municipalities respond differently to tax rate changes by 
their low tax neighbours and high tax neighbours.  
It should be noted that also the SIV method produces a version of ACR weighted by the 
various attributes of neighbours in a complicated way. Thus, the policy change based IV and 
the SIV methods estimate different parameters. If differences in the reaction functions are 
insignificant, ACR’s estimated with different (valid) instruments are the same, but 
heterogeneity in responses may imply that the policy change based IV estimates and the SIV 
estimates are not directly comparable.    
From Figure 1 it is also evident that the policy change based IV strategy implicitly assumes 
that reaction functions for imposed increases and voluntary increases are similar. In section 6, 
I provide further discussion on the possibility that the reactions to voluntary and involuntary 
tax rate changes could be different. 
4.6. Spatial weights 
The choice of the spatial weight matrix that aggregates tax rates in other jurisdictions into a 
single number is an important part of empirical studies on tax competition. Table 1 describes 
spatial weight matrices used in this study. I use the simple nearest neighbour (first order 
contiguity) matrix Wa as the base specification. Matrix Wa gives positive weights to nearest 
neighbours and zero weights to other municipalities. In other words, if municipality i shares a 
border with ni municipalities, all of its neighbours get weights 1/ni and other municipalities 
get zero weights. Because the choice of the weight matrix is somewhat arbitrary, I test the 
robustness of the results to three alternative weight matrices. Matrix Wb differs from Wa by 
weighting nearest neighbours by their population in 1998. Both Wa and Wb assume that tax 
competition is limited to nearest neighbours but matrices Wc and Wd allow for a larger spatial 
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scale. Matrix Wc gives nearest neighbours weight 1 and neighbour’s neighbours weight 0.5 
and matrix Wd weights additionally by population in 1998. All the weight matrices are row-
normalized so that each row sums up to unity and the resulting aggregate tax rate is a 
weighted average. 
[Table 1 here] 
5. Empirical analysis 
 
5.1. Data and descriptive analysis 
I use panel data on Finnish municipalities from 1993 to 2004. There were altogether 444 
municipalities in 2004, but the sample size reduces to 411 after dropping municipalities with 
missing data (notably the autonomic area of Åland Island) and municipalities that merged 
with other municipalities over the period. In the policy change based 2SLS regressions, I use 
data from 1999 onwards because all the identifying variation in the instrument took place 
between 1999 and 2000. The data includes information on property tax rates and socio-
economic attributes such as population, age structure, income and unemployment. Also, 
information on central government grants and on the position of the municipality in the tax 
base equalization system is included. Table 2 reports summary statistics for variables used in 
the analysis. In Table 2 neighbours’ tax rate changes are calculated using a nearest neighbour 
spatial weight matrix (Wa in Table 1). The average general property tax rate in 2000 was 
roughly 0.6% and the average imposed tax increase was 0.07%-points. Thus the average 
proportional increase in the general property tax rate induced by the reform was roughly 
12%. The residential building tax rates are lower (mean 0.27%) and the average imposed 
increase was 0.02%-points. Outside Table 2, it is worth mentioning that neighbours’ imposed 
tax rate changes are positive for the bulk of municipalities (85% for the general property tax 
and 95% for the residential building tax).13 Thus, the policy change based IV estimation uses 
variation from a significant share of municipalities. Finally, Table 2 shows that municipalities 
are highly heterogeneous in terms of population, age structure, unemployment rate, 
disposable income and grants. 
[Table 2 here] 
Map 1 shows the property tax rates in 1998. From the maps it is clear that property tax rates 
are spatially correlated. In order to answer the question whether this cross-sectional 
correlation is spurious correlation due to spatial autocorrelation in the underlying 
determinants of tax rates or an outcome of localized strategic interaction, I use the empirical 
strategy outlined in Section 4.  
                                                     
13 The share of municipalities with strictly positive neighbours’ imposed increases is slightly lower in the sub-
samples of municipalities unlikely to end up in a corner solution (81% for the general property tax and 94% for 
the residential building tax).  
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[Map 1 here] 
5.2. Policy change based 2SLS estimates 
Tables 3-5 report the main results of this study. Table 3 contains the 2SLS results for the first 
differenced equation (2) for the general property tax and Table 4 reports corresponding 
estimates for the residential building tax. Table 5 reports specifications with 2-5 year 
differences for the dependent variable for both tax rates. All the tax rate variables are 
measured in percentage points. Tables 3-5 use the simple nearest neighbour spatial weight 
matrix Wa. Table A3 in the Appendix shows results with alternative spatial weights Wb,Wc 
and Wd. 
In Table 3, the dependent variable is the change in the general property tax rate between 1999 
and 2000. The explanatory variable of interest is neighbours’ tax rate change between 1999 
and 2000, which is instrumented with the predicted imposed increase in neighbours’ tax rates. 
The first stage regressions for Table 3 are reported in Table A1 of the appendix. The 
instrument is positive and highly significant with a coefficient of about 0.7-0.8 in all the first 
stage regressions. The Kleinbergen-Paap F statistics indicate that the predicted imposed 
increase is a very strong instrument.  
The first two columns of Table 3 report results with data including all municipalities. The 
first column shows results for a specification that only includes the predicted own imposed 
increase and a dummy variable for a strictly positive predicted own imposed increase as 
controls. The coefficient on neighbours’ tax rate change is positive but small and statistically 
insignificant. Taken at face value, the point estimate would imply that a percentage point 
increase in the neighbourhood tax rates would lead to a 0.045%-point increase in the tax rate. 
In the second column, differenced municipality attributes are added as control variables. The 
attributes include grants from central government, disposable income per capita, 
unemployment rate and age structure (shares of under 15, 65-74 and over 74 years old). The 
inclusion of the municipality attributes leads to a slightly higher but still small and 
insignificant coefficient for neighbours’ tax rate change. Own imposed increase, which 
captures the direct effect of the policy change on the municipality, is positive and highly 
significant in columns 1 and 2 indicating that the policy change was an important determinant 
of tax rate changes in the year 2000. 
Next I address the corner solution problem discussed in Section 4.4 by dropping from the 
sample municipalities that in 1999 had a tax rate below the new lower limit of the year 2000. 
The results from this sub-sample are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3. Predicted own 
imposed increase is not included in control variables because it is not meaningful for the sub-
sample. In column 3, the coefficient on neighbours’ tax rate change is -0.089 and 
insignificant, and remains virtually unchanged in column 4 where control variables are added. 
Overall, the results indicate that there is no spatial interaction in general property tax rates. 
[Table 3 here] 
15
  
Table 4 reports the results of the first differenced specifications, analogous to Table 3, for the 
residential building tax. The first stage regressions are reported in appendix Table A2. The 
instrument is positive and highly significant in all specifications. The Kleinbergen-Paap F 
statistics indicate that the predicted imposed increase is a strong instrument, albeit somewhat 
weaker than for the general property tax. In Table 4, the coefficient on neighbours’ tax rates 
varies from -0.15 to 0.11 and is statistically insignificant in all specifications. The results 
suggest that there is no interaction in the residential building tax rate choices. However, 
standard errors are larger than for the general property tax, and hence, the results are less 
conclusive than for the general property tax. 
[Table 4 here] 
The regressions in Tables 3 and 4 assume that municipalities respond to contemporaneous tax 
rate changes in their neighbour municipalities. It could be that actual reactions take place 
with a lag. In order to allow for lagged reactions, I repeat the analysis using longer 
differences for the dependent variable. Table 5 shows the results for both the general property 
tax and the residential building tax. Columns 1-4 use 2-5 year differences respectively. The 
explanatory variable of interest is the same as before (neighbours’ tax rate changes from 1999 
to 2000). The sample used is the unconstrained subsample. The tax interaction coefficient is 
small and insignificant in all specifications for both the general property tax and the 
residential building tax. 
[Table 5 here] 
Taken together, Tables 3-5 provide strong evidence against interaction in tax rate choices 
among nearby municipalities in Finland. All the specifications give estimates that are close to 
zero. Moreover, the standard errors are relatively small and tax interaction coefficients of the 
order of 0.4 – 0.5 found in many earlier studies, using the standard SL and SIV methods, can 
be ruled out for the Finnish data. This raises the question whether the discrepancy in the 
results is likely to be explained by differences in institutional settings or differences in the 
empirical methods used. Section 5.5 addresses this question. Before turning to the 
comparison of the standard spatial econometric estimates and the policy change based 
estimates, the validity of the policy change based IV and the robustness of the results are 
evaluated in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.  
5.3. Placebo tests 
The identifying assumption behind the policy change based IV estimates is that the 
instrument is uncorrelated with the error term of equation (2). The assumption does not hold 
if, due to some unobserved factors, municipalities with large imposed increases in 
neighbours’ tax rates would have changed their tax rates differently from other municipalities 
in the absence of the policy change. Suggestive evidence on the likelihood that the 
identifying assumption holds can be obtained by using a placebo treatment type methodology 
for tax rate changes in pre-policy change years. In Table 6, I regress tax rate changes in 1999, 
1998 and 1997 on neighbours’ tax rate change in 2000 (instrumented similarly as before). 
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Trends or shocks in unobserved factors correlated with the instrument would result in 
coefficients significantly different from zero. However, the coefficients are low and 
insignificant varying around zero for both the general property tax rate and the residential 
building tax rate showing that the instrument is not correlated with unobserved factors 
driving tax rates before the policy change took place. This suggests that the instrument can be 
considered exogenous also in the post-policy change years and increases confidence in the 
main results. 
[Table 6 here] 
5.4. Robustness checks 
Table A3 in the appendix analyses the robustness of the results to alternative spatial 
weighting schemes (Wb, Wc and Wd in Table 1). Panels A and B show the results for the 
general tax rate and the residential rate respectively. I allow for lagged responses by using 
one to five year differences for the dependent variable. The coefficients on neighbours’ tax 
rate change are insignificant with all the weight matrices in all specifications. 
One potential reason for the apparent lack of interaction in property tax rates found in Tables 
3-5 is that the equalization component of the grant system weakens incentives to compete for  
tax base. In Section 3 I argue that the incentives to attract tax base are higher for 
municipalities above the so called equalization limit. In order to test for the importance of 
incentives created by the equalization system, I interact neighbours’ tax rate change with a 
dummy variable that gets the value one if the municipality was above the equalization limit in 
1998.14 I use the 1998 value and not differenced values since changes in the position of 
municipalities in the equalization system are rare. If the equalization system has influence on 
the reaction functions of municipalities, one would expect the interaction term to get a 
positive value. I use the same instrument as earlier for the neighbourhood tax rates. The 
interaction of the instrument with the dummy for the equalization status is used as an 
additional instrument for the interaction term. Table A4 reports the results for both taxes for 
specifications with one and two year tax rate differences as the dependent variable. Both the 
main effect of the neighbourhood tax rate change and its interaction with the dummy for 
being above the equalization limit are close to zero and insignificant in all specifications. The 
results indicate that even municipalities with higher incentives to compete for tax base choose 
their general property tax rates independently of their neighbours’ tax rates. 
5.5. Comparisons with standard spatial econometrics methods 
Next I apply the SL and SIV methods that have been used in earlier studies and compare the 
results with the policy change based causal estimates reported in Tables 3-5. The purpose is 
not to provide a comprehensive analysis of the sources of bias in these methods but rather to 
check if the easily applicable standard SL and SIV methods give estimates that are close to 
                                                     
14 Edmark and Ågren (2008) find that in Sweden the correlation between neighbour municipalities’ income tax 
rates was weaker after a reform which reduced incentives to compete for tax base. 
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the policy change based estimates. I estimate both cross-sectional and municipality fixed 
effects variants of the SL and SIV models.  
Table 7 contains the SIV estimates for both the general property tax (columns 1-2) and the 
residential building tax (columns 3-4). I use data from 1993-1999 before the policy change 
when few municipalities were constrained by the tax rate limits. Spatially lagged 
municipality attributes (shares of under 15, 65-74 and over 74 years old, grants from the 
central government, disposable income per capita and unemployment rate) are used as 
instruments for the spatial lag of tax rates. The first column reports pooled cross-sectional 
estimates without municipality fixed effects. The coefficient on neighbours’ general property 
tax rate is 0.26 and highly significant. The first stage F indicates that the instruments are 
strong predictors of neighbours’ tax rates but the exogeneity test suggests that the instruments 
can not be excluded from the second stage regression. The cross-sectional SIV and SL 
models are the standard methods used in the tax competition literature and few earlier studies 
control for jurisdiction fixed effects. Nevertheless, in order to facilitate the comparability 
with the policy change based estimates, I add municipality fixed effects in the model in the 
second column.15 This reduces the strength of the instruments and the first stage F is 
indicative of a weak instrument problem. The coefficient is roughly 0.5 but only weakly 
significant.  
Turning to the SIV estimates for the residential property tax in columns 3-4, the coefficient 
on neighbours’ tax rate is 0.35 and highly significant in the pooled cross-sectional 
specification. Adding municipality fixed effects increases the coefficient to 0.63. Unlike for 
the general property tax, the instruments are reasonably strong also in the fixed effect 
specification and the estimates are relatively precise.  
[Table 7 here] 
Table 8 shows the SL estimates for both tax rates.16 Municipality attributes included in the 
model are the same as before. Starting from the general property tax, the tax rate interaction 
coefficient is 0.45 and highly significant in the first column reporting the standard cross-
sectional SL estimates. Even though previous SL tax competition studies do not use 
jurisdiction fixed effects, the second column controls for municipality fixed effects, for the 
sake of comparability, through first differencing and the third column uses 5 year 
differences.17 The estimates are 0.16 and 0.1 respectively. Hence, when fixed effects are 
controlled for through differencing, the SL estimates are similar to the policy change based 
                                                     
15 I also estimated first differenced specifications, but the instruments were too weak for the estimates to be 
meaningful. 
16 The SL estimations were carried out with STATA using the spatial data analysis tool package spatreg by 
Maurizio Pisati. 
17 I report results using a cross-section of differenced data instead of time demeaned data or municipality 
dummy variables because within estimation imposes an additional restrictive assumption that observations are 
independently distributed within a municipality. 
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IV for the general property tax. For the residential building tax (columns 4-6), the SL 
estimates are positive and highly significant even in the differenced specifications.  
[Table 8 here] 
It should be noted that the discussion on heterogeneous effects in Section 4.5 implies that the 
comparisons of estimates with different methods should be interpreted cautiously. However, 
the comparison of the widely used SIV and SL estimates with the policy change IV estimates 
casts doubt on the reliability of the SIV and SL methods. Both cross-sectional and 
municipality fixed effects variants of the SIV and SL models tend to give positive estimates 
of tax rate interaction while the policy change IV estimates are consistent with flat reaction 
functions. Especially for the residential building tax, both SIV and SL estimates are in stark 
contrast with the policy change based IV estimates. For the general property tax, the cross-
sectional SIV estimates are large and positive and become even larger but imprecise once 
fixed effects are added to the model. The standard cross-sectional SL method gives large and 
positive coefficients for the general property tax, but when controlling for fixed effects the 
coefficient reduces and becomes insignificant. 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper utilizes a Finnish policy intervention to study tax competition between local 
governments. The findings indicate that there is no strategic interaction in property tax rates 
among neighbouring municipalities.  
The empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical literature discussed in Section 2. 
The theoretical prediction for the slope of the tax rate reaction function is ambiguous because 
the reduced form reaction functions estimated in this paper are likely affected by potentially 
opposing forces. The Tiebout/tax competition models with mobile residents and heterogenous 
preferences may yield flat or negative reaction functions as well as positive (Brueckner and 
Saavedra, 2001), yard-stick competition gives rise to positive interdependence, and positive 
(negative) benefit spillovers lead to negative (positive) interaction.  
Naturally, there are other potential explanations for the lack of localized strategic interaction 
in Finland. Firstly, it may be that the fiscal equalization system dampens incentives to 
compete for tax base. However, I do not find evidence of significant tax competition even 
above the equalization threshold, where municipalities benefit significantly if they manage to 
attract more investment within their borders. Secondly, it may be that municipalities compete 
on business and housing capital on a wider geographical level than the neighbourhood level 
used in this study. Localized tax competition among neighbours requires the tax base to be, at 
least to some extent, locally fixed and not freely mobile (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001). 
Thirdly, it may be that Finnish municipal politicians are not largely motivated by self interest 
and voters trust that tax revenues are not wasted on useless bureaucracy. This could explain 
the lack of `yardstick competition` between neighbouring municipality councils. However, it 
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should be noted that the policy change used to derive the instrumental variable is not ideal for 
testing for yardstick competition. Tax rate increases imposed by the central government may 
be less relevant for yardstick competition than voluntary tax rate changes. Voters may 
understand that the imposed increase in their neighbour municipality is not related to an 
increase in the costs and demand for services in the area, and hence, politicians may be less 
keen on mimicking imposed tax rate changes than voluntary changes. Nevertheless, one 
would expect that in the long run, when the reasons for the imposed tax increases are distant, 
the yardstick competition mechanisms would trigger responses to even imposed tax increases. 
I do not find evidence of significant responses to neighbours’ tax increases even after five 
years.  
While flat tax rate reaction functions are compatible with the theoretical literature, the finding 
of no tax rate interaction is in contrast with most other empirical studies that have generally 
found the tax rates of neighbouring local governments to be positively related. Naturally, the 
absence of interaction may be specific to the Finnish setting where property taxes are a 
relatively unimportant source of revenue. However, the comparison of the estimates based on 
the policy change to the SL and SIV estimates showed that the methods used in earlier 
literature tend to give positive estimates for spatial interdependence in tax rates even with 
Finnish data. In particular, the cross-sectional SL and SIV model gave consistently upward 
biased estimates for the reactions to tax rates in other municipalities. The discrepancies 
between the policy intervention based estimates and the SL and SIV estimates suggest that 
the standard spatial econometrics methods may not give reliable estimates of the fiscal 
interaction parameters of interest. More empirical research on different types of fiscal 
interaction using quasi-experimental data for different countries is needed to get better 
estimates of the interaction parameters and to better understand the strengths and limitations 
of the commonly used spatial regression techniques.  
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TABLES 
Table 1 
Spatial weight matrices used 
 
  
Nearest  
neighbours 
Neighbours' 
neighbours 
Other  
Municipalities 
Matrix Wa  1  0  0 
Matrix Wb  Pop1998  0  0 
Matrix Wc  1  0.5  0 
Matrix Wd  Pop1998  0.5*Pop1998  0 
All matrices are normalized so that each row sums up to one. 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics (year 2000) 
 
   Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
General property tax rate (%)         
Tax rate  0.593  0.120  0.500  1.000 
Tax rate change  0.069  0.085  ‐0.100  0.300 
Own imposed tax rate change  0.070  0.094  0.000  0.300 
Neighbours' tax rate change  0.056  0.052  ‐0.009  0.300 
Neighbours' imposed tax rate change  0.060  0.057  0.000  0.300 
Residential building tax rate (%)         
Tax rate  0.265  0.048  0.220  0.400 
Tax rate change  0.030  0.040  ‐0.100  0.200 
Own imposed tax rate change  0.021  0.030  0.000  0.120 
Neighbours' tax rate change  0.027  0.024  ‐0.021  0.174 
Neighbours' imposed tax rate change  0.024  0.023  0.000  0.120 
Municipality attributes         
Population (1000's)  12.51  35.05  0.24  555.47 
Grants/capita (1000's)  1.34  0.48  0.10  3.09 
Disposable income/capita (1000's)  11.24  2.42  7.13  31.65 
Unemployment rate  0.133  0.046  0.037  0.284 
Age 0‐15  0.198  0.032  0.110  0.341 
Age 61‐74  0.146  0.029  0.059  0.239 
Age 75‐  0.082  0.024  0.019  0.144 
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Table 3 
 General property tax: policy change based 2SLS estimates for first differenced specification 
 
Dep. var: Tax rate change (Δ2000‐1999)  All municipalities 
Unconstrained  
sub‐sample 
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000‐1999)  0.045  0.069  ‐0.089  ‐0.103 
  [0.077]  [0.078]  [0.087]  [0.092]    
Own imposed increase  0.825***  0.828***                    
  [0.062]  [0.059]                    
Non‐zero own imposed increase (1/0)  ‐0.018*  ‐0.019*                    
  [0.010]  [0.010]                    
Per capita grants  (Δ1999‐1998)    ‐0.003    0.011 
    [0.042]    [0.053]    
Per capita income  (Δ1999‐1998)    0.000    ‐0.001 
    [0.003]    [0.003]    
Unemployment rate (Δ1999‐1998)    ‐0.274    0.29 
    [0.329]    [0.363]    
Age 0‐15  (Δ1999‐1998)    0.616    ‐0.031 
    [0.574]    [0.736]    
Age 61‐75  (Δ1999‐1998)    0.495    0.291 
    [0.793]    [0.847]    
Age 75‐  (Δ1999‐1998)    0.738    2.004 
    [1.271]    [1.638]    
Kleibergen‐Paap F  237.6  241.8  83.1  90.9 
R‐squared  0.611  0.614  0.001  0.003 
Observations  411  411  258  258 
Neighbours’ expected imposed increase used as an instrument for neighbours’ tax rate change. 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa). 
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Table 4 
 Residential building tax: policy change based 2SLS estimates for first differenced specification 
 
Dep. var: Tax rate change (Δ2000‐1999)  All municipalities 
Unconstrained  
sub‐sample 
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000‐1999)  0.060  0.106  ‐0.146  ‐0.057 
  [0.191]  [0.191]  [0.159]  [0.161] 
Own imposed increase  0.642***  0.638***     
  [0.093]  [0.091]     
Non‐zero own imposed increase (1/0)  0.003  0.003     
  [0.004]  [0.004]     
Per capita grants (Δ1999‐1998)    ‐0.051*    ‐0.015 
    [0.029]    [0.039] 
Per capita income (Δ1999‐1998)    ‐0.005***    ‐0.004* 
    [0.002]    [0.002] 
Unemployment rate (Δ1999‐1998)    0.229    0.227 
    [0.162]    [0.234] 
Age 0‐15  (Δ1999‐1998)    0.093    ‐0.132 
    [0.388]    [0.543] 
Age 61‐75  (Δ1999‐1998)    0.381    0.503 
    [0.444]    [0.626] 
Age 75‐  (Δ1999‐1998)    1.155    1.327 
    [0.915]    [0.976] 
Kleibergen‐Paap F  97.9  87.1  27.3  24.1 
R‐squared  0.308  0.333  0.001  0.029 
Observations  411  411  218  218 
Neighbours’ expected imposed increase used as an instrument for neighbours’ tax rate change. 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa). 
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Table 5 
Policy change based 2SLS estimates for 2–5 year differences of the dependent variable 
 
Panel A: General property tax             
Dep. var: Long term tax rate change  Δ2001‐1999  Δ2002‐1999  Δ2003‐1999  Δ2004‐1999 
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000‐1999)  ‐0.079  0.061  0.133  0.135 
  [0.100]  [0.150]  [0.178]  [0.176]    
Municipality attributes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Kleibergen‐Paap F  90.9  90.9  90.9  90.9 
R‐squared  0.015  0.043  0.045  0.029 
Observations  258  258  258  258 
Panel B: Residential building tax             
Dep. var: Long term tax rate change  Δ2001‐1999  Δ2002‐1999  Δ2003‐1999  Δ2004‐1999 
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000‐1999)  0.003  0.114  ‐0.027  ‐0.161 
  [0.172]  [0.234]  [0.251]  [0.255]    
Municipality attributes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Kleibergen‐Paap F  24.1  24.1  24.1  24.1 
R‐squared  0.026  0.053  0.063  0.07 
Observations  218  218  218  218 
Neighbours’ expected imposed increase used as an instrument for neighbours’ tax rate change. 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa). 
 
 
Table 6 
Placebo effects in pre-treatment years 
 
   General property tax     Residential building tax 
Dep. var: Past tax rate change  Δ1999‐1998  Δ1998‐1997  Δ1997‐1996  Δ1999‐1998  Δ1998‐1997  Δ1997‐1996 
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000‐1999)  ‐0.13  0.042  0.102  ‐0.032  0.068  ‐0.046 
  [0.163]  [0.117]  [0.078]  [0.297]  [0.178]  [0.087] 
Municipality attributes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Kleibergen‐Paap F  75.9  84.6  85.7  22.7  26.9  23.8 
R‐squared  0.018  0.049  0.021  0.022  0.016  0.023 
Observations  258  258  258  218  218  218 
Neighbours’ expected imposed increase used as an instrument for neighbours’ tax rate change. 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa). 
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Table 7 
Spatial IV estimates 
 
Dep. Var: Tax rate  General property tax   Residential building tax 
Neighbours' tax rate (t)  0.257***  0.555*  0.354***  0.632*** 
  [0.093]  [0.309]  [0.123]  [0.168] 
Per capita grants  (t‐1)  0.012  ‐0.038**  0.005  ‐0.003 
  [0.015]  [0.019]  [0.005]  [0.011] 
Per capita income  (t‐1)  0.024***  ‐0.014***  ‐0.002**  ‐0.007*** 
  [0.006]  [0.005]  [0.001]  [0.002] 
Unemployment rate (t‐1)  0.578***  0.136  0.067**  0.031 
  [0.095]  [0.083]  [0.030]  [0.048] 
Age 0‐15  (t‐1)  ‐0.973***  ‐0.727**  0.137**  0.121 
  [0.231]  [0.287]  [0.061]  [0.163] 
Age 61‐75  (t‐1)  ‐0.969***  0.118  0.146**  0.187 
  [0.233]  [0.283]  [0.072]  [0.174] 
Age 75‐  (t‐1)  0.397  ‐0.669*  0.191*  0.539* 
  [0.287]  [0.390]  [0.101]  [0.315] 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Municipality fixed effects    Yes    Yes 
Kleibergen‐Paap F  59.5  8.0  24.0  13.0 
Hansen's J (p‐value)  0.000  0.559  0.000  0.777 
R‐squared  0.278  0.118  0.183  0.14 
Observations  2466  2466  2466  2466 
Sample period 1993 ‐ 1999. 
Spatial IV uses neighbours’ characteristics as instruments for neighbours’ tax rate change. 
Standard errors clustered at municipality level in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa). 
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Table 8 
Maximum Likelihood Spatial Lag estimates 
 
 
   General property tax     Residential building tax 
Dep. Var: Tax rate  level 1999  Δ1999‐1998  Δ1999‐1994  level 1999  Δ1999‐1998  Δ1999‐1994 
Neighbours' tax rate  0.449***  0.160**  0.104  0.361***  0.201***  0.312*** 
  [0.054]  [0.072]  [0.076]     [0.059]  [0.069]  [0.060]    
Per capita grants  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]     [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]    
Per capita income  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  ‐0.000*   
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]     [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]    
Unemployment rate  0.007***  0.007*  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.000 
  [0.002]  [0.004]  [0.002]     [0.001]  [0.002]  [0.001]    
Age 0‐15  ‐0.019***  ‐0.013  ‐0.010*    0.000  ‐0.003  0.003 
  [0.004]  [0.010]  [0.005]     [0.002]  [0.005]  [0.003]    
Age 61‐75  ‐0.015***  ‐0.013  0.003  0.001  ‐0.006  0.005*   
  [0.005]  [0.011]  [0.005]     [0.002]  [0.006]  [0.003]    
Age 75‐  ‐0.008  ‐0.011  ‐0.017**  0.000  0.007  0.005 
  [0.006]  [0.015]  [0.008]     [0.003]  [0.008]  [0.004]    
Log‐likelihood  240.1  502.3  359.9  596.9  786.9  639.2 
Observations  411  411  411  411  411  411 
Covariates differenced similarly as the dependent variable.  
Standard errors in brackets. 
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa). 
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GRAPHS, FIGURES AND MAPS 
Graph 1  
Property tax rates in 1999 and the reform of 2000 
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Figure 1  
Reaction functions and tax rate limits  
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Map 1  
Property tax rates in 1998 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
 
Table A1  
First stage regressions for the general property tax (cf. Table 3) 
 
Dep var: Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000‐1999)  All municipalities 
Unconstrained  
sub‐sample 
Neighbours' imposed increase  0.744***  0.755***  0.683***  0.693*** 
  [0.048]  [0.049]  [0.075]  [0.073]    
Own imposed increase  0.010  0.010                    
  [0.029]  [0.029]                    
Non‐zero own imposed increase (1/0)  0.000  0.001                    
  [0.005]  [0.005]                    
Per capita grants (Δ1999‐1998)    ‐0.028    ‐0.054*   
    [0.021]    [0.030]    
Per capita income (Δ1999‐1998)    0.006**    0.007*** 
    [0.003]    [0.003]    
Unemployment rate (Δ1999‐1998)    ‐0.042    0.100 
    [0.163]    [0.224]    
Age 0‐15  (Δ1999‐1998)    ‐0.089    ‐0.004 
    [0.468]    [0.664]    
Age 61‐75  (Δ1999‐1998)    0.149    0.456 
    [0.511]    [0.733]    
Age 75‐  (Δ1999‐1998)    ‐0.014    0.905 
    [0.716]    [1.004]    
Kleibergen‐Paap F  237.6  241.8  83.1  90.9 
R‐squared  0.647  0.657  0.492  0.517 
Observations  411  411  258  258 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa). 
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Table A2  
First stage regressions for the residential building tax (cf. Table 4) 
 
Dep var: Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000‐1999)  All municipalities 
Unconstrained  
sub‐sample 
Neighbours' imposed increase  0.665***  0.677***  0.631***  0.621*** 
  [0.067]  [0.073]  [0.121]  [0.127]    
Own imposed increase  0.008  0.013                    
  [0.045]  [0.045]                    
Non‐zero own imposed increase (1/0)  ‐0.001  ‐0.001                    
  [0.002]  [0.002]                    
Per capita grants (Δ1999‐1998)    ‐0.017    ‐0.019 
    [0.012]    [0.015]    
Per capita income (Δ1999‐1998)    0.002*    0.002 
    [0.001]    [0.001]    
Unemployment rate (Δ1999‐1998)    0.027    0.035 
    [0.082]    [0.104]    
Age 0‐15  (Δ1999‐1998)    ‐0.052    0.148 
    [0.250]    [0.339]    
Age 61‐75  (Δ1999‐1998)    0.231    ‐0.164 
    [0.236]    [0.269]    
Age 75‐  (Δ1999‐1998)    0.344    ‐0.148 
    [0.411]    [0.398]    
Kleibergen‐Paap F  97.9  87.1  27.3  24.1 
R‐squared  0.429  0.437  0.338  0.349 
Observations  411  411  218  218 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa). 
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Table A3 
Policy change based 2SLS estimates with alternative spatial weights  
 
Panel A: General property tax                
Dep. var: Tax rate change  Δ2000‐1999  Δ2001‐1999  Δ2002‐1999  Δ2003‐1999  Δ2004‐1999 
Spatial weights: Wb           
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000‐1999)  ‐0.061  ‐0.02  0.172  0.243  0.149 
  [0.088]  [0.098]  [0.152]  [0.184]  [0.178]    
Spatial weights: Wc           
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000‐1999)  0.012  0.138  0.304  0.279  0.165 
  [0.149]  [0.165]  [0.285]  [0.317]  [0.296]    
Spatial weights: Wd           
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000‐1999)  ‐0.107  ‐0.07  0.111  0.097  0.098 
  [0.120]  [0.132]  [0.241]  [0.266]  [0.250]    
Panel B: Residential building tax                
Dep. var: Tax rate change  Δ2000‐1999  Δ2001‐1999  Δ2002‐1999  Δ2003‐1999  Δ2004‐1999 
Spatial weights: Wb                
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000‐1999)  ‐0.056  0.002  0.137  0.094  0.006 
  [0.130]  [0.151]  [0.197]  [0.208]  [0.211]    
Spatial weights: Wc           
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000‐1999)  0.209  0.169  0.084  ‐0.056  ‐0.193 
  [0.161]  [0.174]  [0.204]  [0.253]  [0.218]    
Spatial weights: Wd           
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000‐1999)  0.159  0.154  0.178  ‐0.015  ‐0.222 
   [0.158]  [0.168]  [0.235]  [0.269]  [0.253]    
All specifications include the same municipality attributes as control variables as Table 5. 
Neighbours’ expected imposed increase used as an instrument for neighbours’ tax rate change. 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: See Table 1. 
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Table A4 
Interaction with the position in the equalization system 
 
   General property tax  Residential building tax 
Dep. var: Tax rate change  Δ2000‐1999  Δ2001‐1999  Δ2000‐1999  Δ2001‐1999 
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000‐1999)  ‐0.117  ‐0.074  ‐0.039  0.034 
  [0.097]  [0.109]  [0.182]  [0.196] 
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000‐1999)  0.046  ‐0.018  ‐0.066  ‐0.112 
*Dummy(Above equalization limit)  [0.106]  [0.116]  [0.122]  [0.142] 
Municipality attributes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Kleibergen‐Paap F  41.6  41.6  9.9  9.9 
R‐squared  0.008  0.014  0.031  0.03 
Observations  258  258  218  218 
Neighbours’ expected imposed increase used as an instrument for neighbours’ tax rate change. 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa). 
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